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Introduction  
 
The choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime hCs been at the centre of the debate in 
international economics for a long time. At the start of the 1960’s, the literature on optimal 
exchange rate arrangements was cast as a general debate over the choice between fixed or 
flexible rates. There was broad agreement that both regimes had advantages and 
disadvantages.
1 During this period of time and until 1973, exchange rate policy was 
dominated by the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944, with its commitment to currencies 
convertible for current account transactions and fixed exchange rates (beyond a narrow band 
of permissible flexibility) but adjustable if necessary.  
 
Five years after the breakdown the Bretton Woods arrangement, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) decided that member countries can choose any exchange arrangement that suits 
them, provided that it is declared to the IMF and provided that it is consistent with the general 
objectives of the IMF.
2 Most major industrial nations have abandoned their fixed exchange 
regimes, with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and moved to a system of floating 
exchange rates. However, the option of a pure floating exchange rate did not seem to be 
feasible for small developing countries since it was recognized that flexible exchange rates 
would be associated with inappropriate changes in household’s purchasing power, misdirected 
investment and detrimental effects on trade. 
 
Four decades after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange 
rates, developing countries (and all IMF members) have the option of adopting a potentially 
wide variety of exchange rate regimes. Today, in the official classification by the IMF, 
exchange rate arrangements are divided into three broad categories: pegged or fixed 
arrangements, flexible arrangements and an in-between category of arrangements with 
“limited flexibility”. Fixed arrangements include: Currency Unions, Currency Boards and 
truly fixed exchange rates. Floating exchange rates are divided into free floats where 
monetary authorities do not intervene and allow the exchange rate to be determined by market 
forces, and managed floats where intervention is done to “lean against the wind”. Finally, 
intermediate arrangements run the continuum from an adjustable peg under which countries 
can periodically realign their pegs; to crawling pegs in which the peg is frequently reset in a 
series of devaluations; to a basket peg where the exchange rate is fixed in terms of a weighted 
basket of foreign currencies; to target zones (or exchange rate regimes with bands) where the 
authorities intervene when the exchange rate hits pre announced margins on either side of a 
central parity. Among 192 countries classified by the IMF at the end of 2006, 100 countries 
where listed as having fixed exchange arrangements (Italy, Germany, Djibouti, Egypt etc.), 76 
maintained flexible arrangements (United states, Mexico, Israel, Tunisia etc..) and 16 were 
regarded as having intermediate arrangements (Iran, Slovenia, Morocco, Denmark etc..).
3 
This illustrates the fact that different types of exchange rate arrangements may be appropriate 
for different countries, depending on their structural characteristics, external environments, 
and macroeconomic and political circumstances. Clearly, national choices of exchange 
regimes reveal a lack of consensus in the world today.
4 
 
                                                 
1 See for instance Friedman (1953), Kindelberger (1969). 
2 See IMF’s Article IV of agreement on obligations regarding exchange arrangements.  
3 See IMF (2006) for more details. 
4 In Jeffrey Frankel’s Words “No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or At All Times”.   3
In spite of the wide range and diversity of exchange rate arrangements adopted by the Middle 
East and North African (MENA) countries
5, no theoretical or empirical contributions had 
been devoted to the question of the choice of exchange rate regime by these economies. These 
countries are small in economic size, have a low level of export and import diversification and 
exhibit strong trade with the European Union (EU). Over the period 1990- 2000, nearly 70% 
of Tunisia’s and Algeria’s exports have been oriented to the “Euroland” market, 60% of 
Morocco’s, 50% of Egypt’s and 45% of Turkey’s. The same dependency exists for their 
imports, since the EU is also the main source of MENA imports.
6 These common structural 
characteristics would lend support to the hypothesis that these countries should peg to the 
Euro, however most of the MENA countries including Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Oman and the Syrian Arab Republic pegged their currencies to the US dollar, while others 
like Tunisia opted for a managed float exchange rate regime.  
 
This study attempts to uncover possible systematic relationships between the choice of an 
exchange rate regime by the MENA countries and some traditional determinants proposed in 
the existing literature. By utilizing two different exchange rate classifications (IMF and 
Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002)), we estimate several binomial and multinomial Probit models 
of various specifications of the traditional optimum currency area (OCA) theory and of newer 
hypothesis of exchange regime choice. Regressions results for 17 MENA countries over the 
1990-2000 period show that among theoretical long-run determinants proposed by the OCA 
theory only the level of economic development has exercised an influence on the choice of 
exchange rate regime through the period studied. We also find that other newer theories like 
the political view or the capital account openness approach can not adequately explain the 
choice of the exchange rate regime by these countries. Finally, our results show that the level 
of international reserves plays a significant role in the choice of exchange regimes in the 
MENA economies.          
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly reviews the three most 
important theories of exchange rate regime choice and summarizes previous empirical 
findings. Section III presents the data used in our analysis and outlines the methodology 
before discussing the estimation results. Section IV concludes. 
 
 
II. Exchange rate regime choice: Theory and Evidence 
 
Theories of exchange rate regime choice can be grouped under three broad headings; the 
OCA theory initiated in the early 1960’s, the political economy theory and the currency crisis 
(capital account openness) approach.  
 
II.1 The OCA theory 
 
The starts of the OCA theory are the seminal contributions by Mundell (1961), Mckinnon 
(1963) and Kenen (1969).
7 OCA theory suggests that the balance of advantages and 
                                                 
5 In 2006; Bahrain, Egypt and Jordan opted for fixed exchange arrangements, Morocco, Iran and Libya for 
intermediate regimes, and Algeria, Tunisia and the Yemen for flexible arrangements. See Appendix (table 1) for 
more details.    
6 The importance of MENA countries in “Euroland” external trade is much smaller; it does not exceed 5%.  
7 An OCA is defined as the optimal geographic domain of a single currency, or of several currencies, whose 
exchange rates are irrevocably pegged and might be unified. OCA theory assumes that factors of production, 
such as labour and capital are mobile between regions of the currency area but immobile out of the OCA. It also 
assumes that there is limited price and wage flexibility in the economy.           4
disadvantages between fixed and flexible exchange rates varies according to the manner and 
extent of economic integration between countries. In essence, it relates the choice of an 
exchange rate regime to some structural characteristics, criteria or properties that are 
relatively stable over time. Mundell (1961) suggested that the degree of factor (labour) 
mobility was a key determinant of the optimal choice of exchange rate regime. According to 
Mundell (1961), a great degree of labour mobility will make it costlier to adjust to external 
shocks with a flexible regime. Mckinnon (1963) focused on the relevance of openness, as 
measured by the ratio of tradable goods production to non tradable goods production. The 
openness of an economy was regarded a key determinant of regime choice. He argued that, 
other things being equal, the greater the openness of an economy, the greater would be the 
responsiveness of domestic wages and prices to a change in the nominal exchange rate, so the 
stronger was the case for fixed exchange rate; as openness increases.
8 Both Mundell (1961) 
and McKinnon (1963) emphasised the fact that the size of an economy can be a key 
determinant of exchange regime choice. Openness is expected to be greater, the smaller the 
economy, therefore the larger the economy, the stronger is the case for flexible regime. The 
third main contribution on OCA theory is due to Kenen (1969). He suggests production 
diversification as a characteristic for optimum currency areas and stressed that a well-
diversified economy will rarely confront changes in demand for its export products. 
According to Kenen (1969), Product diversification decreases the likelihood of asymmetric 
shocks and alleviates their negative effects. Thus, the greater the diversity of an economy’s 
production activities the less severe would be the costs of unpredictable disturbances, so the 
stronger was the case for fixed exchange rates.
9 During the 1980’s and the early 1990’s, 
contributions on the OCA issue have continued to emphasise the criteria approach underlying 
the choice of an optimum currency domain as well as to enumerate the benefits and 
drawbacks of monetary integration. More recently, the theory of optimum currency areas has 
been modified to take in consideration the new views on the long run ineffectiveness of 
monetary policy and the short run Phillips curve, on the credibility issue and the time 
inconsistency problems
10 and the new hypothesis on the possible endogeneity of OCA.
11       
 
Most empirical studies trying to analyse the choice of exchange rate regimes have considered 
many of the OCA variables
12. The most common variables used in these studies are; 
Openness of the country typically measured as exports plus imports divided by GDP, the size 
of the economy generally measured by the GDP, the patterns of trade (geographical 
concentration of trade) measured by the share of trade with the country’s main partner and the 
degree of economic development measured by the GDP per capita. The majority of these 
empirical studies provide large support for the OCA theory suggesting that individual 
                                                 
8 As openness increases “flexible exchange rate become both less effective as a control device for external 
balance and more damaging to internal price level stability McKinnon (1963, p.719) 
9 Following these three main contributions, several other criteria were developed, including the degree of 
financial integration Ingram (1969), the similarity of inflation rates Haberler (1970) and Fleming (1971), the 
degree of policy integration Tower and Willet (1970), the degree of financial or economic development Holden, 
Holden and Suss (1979). See Ishyama (1975) and Tavlas (1993) for and comprehensive review of these criteria.  
10 Tavlas (1993, 1994) 
11 Frankel and Rose (1996) 
12 Heller (1978), Dreyer (1978), Holden, Holden and Suss (1979), Melvin (1985), Savvides (1990), Bosco 
(1987), Cuddington and Otoo (1990, 1991), Honkapohja and Pikkarainen (1992), Collins (1996), Edwards 
(1996), Edwards (1998), Rizzo (1998), Berger, Sturm and de Haan (2000), Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2000), 
Poirson (2001), Von Hagen and Zhou (2002), Juhn and Mauro (2002), Papaioannou (2003), Levy Yeyati, 
Sturzenegger, and Reggio (2002), Bleaney and Francisco (2005) and Markiewicz (2005).   5
structural characteristics could have exercised an influence on the choice of exchange rate 
regime.
13 
 
II.2 The political economy theory 
 
The Political economy theory of exchange regime choice developed mainly from the concept 
of “time inconsistency” first introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
14 The time 
inconsistency problem arises because there are incentives for a policymaker to pursue 
discretionary policy to achieve short-run objectives, such as higher growth and employment, 
even though the result is poor long-run outcomes (high inflation).
15 This stand of literature 
emphasise the role of credibility and political factors in the choice of an exchange rate regime. 
The argument runs as follows. A country whose authorities have a reputation of perusing 
inflationary policies will find it difficult to shed that reputation without a long and costly 
process of disinflation. The time-consistency literature argues that, to gain a reputation of 
credibility, authorities must pursue a policy rule that is time consistent. One way to gain 
credibility is by “tying the hands” of the authorities by fixing the exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
currency of a country with relatively high anti-inflation credibility Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1988).
16 In other words, In an environment of high inflation, as was the case in most 
countries in most countries the 1970’s and the 1980’s, pegging to the currency of a country 
with low inflation or joining a monetary union is viewed as a pre-commitment mechanism to 
anchor inflation expectations.  
 
The optimal choice of regime would therefore rest upon a balance between credibility (or 
discipline) and flexibility. A flexible exchange rate regime allows a country to have an 
independent monetary policy providing the economy with flexibility to accommodate 
domestic and foreign shocks, including changes in external terms of trade and interest rates, 
but this flexibility usually comes at the cost of some loss in credibility and tends to be 
associated with higher inflation. Alternatively, fixed exchange rates reduce the degree of 
flexibility of the system, but they are regarded as a commitment technology that national 
authorities can employ, if they choose, to enhance their credibility. 
 
Several empirical studies on the determinants of exchange rate regime choice have considered 
variables related to the political economy view, including standard political instability 
indicators (frequency of government changes or frequency of transfers of powers to an 
opposition party), government characteristics (monarchical, dictatorial systems or democratic 
regimes) and central bank independence.
17 In spite of the diversity in the sample of countries 
taken, periods of time, methods of estimation, classifications of regimes and assumptions of 
                                                 
13 See Juhn and Mauro (2002) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on OCA models of exchange rate 
regimes. 
14 See also Barro and Gordon (1983). 
15 This argument was based on the theory developed by Barro and Gordon (1983) who discuss the case of a 
central bank using discretionary monetary policy to generate surprise inflation in order to reduce unemployment. 
They demonstrate that with rational expectations the outcome will be higher inflation but unchanged 
employment because the inflationary consequences of the central bank’s actions will be incorporated in workers’ 
wage demands. 
16 As stressed by Tavlas (1993), the time inconsistency literature reverses the ordering between the criterion of 
similarity of inflation rates, as identified by the OCA theory, and currency area participation; similarity of 
inflation is no longer a precondition, but it becomes a desirable outcome.  
17 Edwards (1996), Berger, Sturm and de Haan (2000), Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2000), Poirson (2001), Juhn 
and Mauro (2002), Papaioannou (2003) and Levy Yeyati, Sturzenegger, and Reggio (2002).   6
theoretical and econometric models used by these papers, the empirical findings of these 
contributions remain inconclusive.  
 
II.3 The currency crisis approach 
 
According to the currency crisis or the capital account openness hypothesis countries are (or 
should sooner or later be) moving to the corner solutions.  They are said to be opting either, 
on the one hand, for full flexibility, or, on the other hand, for rigid institutional commitments 
to fixed exchange rates, in the form of currency boards or full monetary union with the dollar 
or euro.
18 It is said that the intermediate exchange rate regimes are no longer feasible because 
of the belief that they have proven themselves to be highly susceptible to speculative crises.
19 
However, the so called bipolar view or the hypothesis of vanishing intermediate regimes has 
absolutely no theoretical foundation; it is only a corollary to the principle of the impossible 
trinity.
20 
 
The hypothesis of vanishing intermediary regimes has been challenged by a number of 
economists including John Williamson and Morris Goldstein. These authors tried to identify a 
viable middle ground that would give the monetary authorities some policy independence, 
while eliminating some of the excessive volatility that might otherwise be associated with a 
completely free float. Williamson (2000) has proposed a modification of the former target 
zone variant for emerging market economies. The new proposal is called the BBC regime, 
where BBC stands for basket, band and crawl. Goldstein (2002) has also championed a new 
exchange rate system for emerging markets, called “Managed Floating Plus”. Unlike the BBC 
proposal, which gives prominence to the exchange rate, the “Managed Floating Plus” 
proposal uses a domestic inflation target as the nominal anchor for monetary policy and gives 
greater attention to stabilizing the domestic economy than to fixing the exchange rate. The 
bipolar view has also been discredited by recent empirical studies on the concepts of “fear of 
floating” Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and “fear of pegging” Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003). 
 
Several empirical studies looked at capital market factors as potential determinants of the 
exchange regime choice. To test this hypothesis, these studies usually included an indicator of 
either capital controls (typically drawn or constructed from the IMF’s Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions publication)
21 or de facto capital openness measured 
by the ratio of private capital inflows and outflows to GDP or the ratio of foreign assets of the 
banking system to the money supply.
22  
 
Finally, most of the empirical contributions included a number of macroeconomic variables 
such as inflation (whether the country’s own inflation, or inflation in excess of partner 
                                                 
18 Summers (2000) wrote that “the choice of appropriate exchange rate regime, which, for economies with 
access to international capital markets, increasingly means a move away from the middle ground of pegged but 
adjustable fixed exchange rates towards the two corner regimes of either flexible exchange rates or a fixed 
exchange rate supported, if necessary, by a commitment to give up altogether an independent monetary policy.” 
19 Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and Fisher (2001). 
20 A country can not achieve the three objectives of exchange rate stability, monetary independence and financial 
market integration simultaneously.  
21 Edwards (1996), Frieden, Ghezzi and Stein (2000), Poirson (2001) and  Juhn and Mauro (2002) 
22 Holden, Holden and Suss (1979), Savvides (1990), Edwards (1996) and Poirson (2001)   7
countries) and foreign exchange reserves and some measures of macroeconomic or financial 
volatility such as the variability of output, domestic credit or the real exchange rate.
23    
  
III. Data, estimation strategy and results. 
 
III.1 Data and estimation strategy 
 
For our empirical analysis, we concentrate on the determinants of exchange rate regime 
choice in 17 MENA countries during the 1990-2000 period.
24 Unless indicated otherwise, all 
underlying data are from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the IMF series. 
 
In order to study the choice of the exchange rate regime, it is necessary to employ the proper 
classification of exchange rate systems. The vast majority of previous studies have attempted 
to explain exchange rate regime choice as self-reported by countries in the IMF’s annual 
report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.
25 The approach taken here is, 
first, to report results according to the official classification, which uses the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. In addition, we supplement 
these results by the de facto classification developed by Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) BB 
(2002).
26 
 
From a technical point of view, given that the dependent variable (the exchange rate regime 
choice) is a qualitative variable that can assume two or more values according to the different 
theoretical hypothesis, probit models are used. The pooled cross-sectional and time-series 
nature of the sample necessitates the use of random effects probit model. A random effect 
probit allows us to obtain unbiased parameter estimates and consistent standard errors in the 
face of within-unit serial correlation and heteroscedastic errors across units Maddala (1987). 
Both binomial and multinomial versions of random effects probit are estimated. The 
dependent variable changes in the binomial and multinomial probit estimations depending on 
whether we are interested in examining the choice between flexible exchange rate regimes 
versus all other arrangements or the choice between fixed, intermediary and floating regimes. 
In the binomial regressions, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if a flexible regime is 
chosen by the country i in year t and 0 otherwise. In the multinomial version, the dependent 
variable takes the value of 0 if a fixed exchange regime is chosen, 1 if an intermediary regime 
is chosen and 2 if a flexible regime is adopted by the country i in year t.
27 
 
Our analysis of the potential determinants of exchange regime choice involves many of the 
explanatory variables that have been suggested by theory and used in previous studies. 
Detailed definitions and data sources are given in Appendix (table 3). The economic 
fundamentals include the degree of openness of the economy (OPEN), geographical 
concentration of foreign trade (GEOCON), per capita real GDP (PCGDP), and real GDP 
                                                 
23 Dreyer (1978), Melvin (1985), Savvides (1990), Collins (1996) Edwards (1996), Rizzo (1998) Poirson (2001) 
and Papaioannou (2003) 
24 Countries included in the empirical analysis are; Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and 
Yemen. Djibouti, Lebanon, Sudan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia were omitted from the sample since most of 
the data used in the analysis is not available for these countries.         
25 Holden, Holden and Suss (1979) and more recently, Poirson (2001) have used measures of the degree of de 
facto floating on the basis of the actual observed volatility of exchange rates and reserves. 
26 We did not use the de facto classifications developed by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) and Reinhart 
and Rogoff’s (2002) because most of the data on exchange rate regimes is not available for MENA countries.  
27 See Appendix (table 2) for more details on exchange rate classifications.   8
(RGDP). The last variable is the ratio of capital inflows plus outflows to GDP (CAPMOB), 
which approximates the degree of capital mobility. 
 
Two different measures of government characteristics were used in the econometric tests to 
proxy for government strength. The first is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) composite 
indicator of democracy (DEMOC) developed by Marshall and Jaggers (2005)
28. The second 
variable, (DURAB) correspond to regime durability as measured by the number of years that 
the incumbent administration has been in office.  
 
Our empirical tests include two different measures of capital openness. The first is a dummy 
variable that indicates the existence or not of restrictions on capital account transactions 
(KAP1). The second is an additive five points scale (0-4) capital controls indicator that adds 
together four dummy variables, each representing the existence of (a) multiple exchange rates, 
(b) current account restrictions, (c) capital account restrictions, and (d) export proceeds 
surrender requirements, respectively (KAP2). The original source for the capital controls data 
is the IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
 
Beside these variables, our empirical investigations use three other macroeconomic variables 
including the central bank reserves as a share of imports (RESM), the inflation differential 
between the domestic inflation rate and the United States inflation (DINF) and the ratio of 
current account balance to GDP (CAGDP).  
 
III.2 Discussion of results 
 
We begin by estimating binary probit models dividing the sample into floats and pegs. While 
the generated binary index reduces the original eight (thirteen) categories of exchange rate 
regimes in the IMF (BB) classification to just two, it still has considerable variance. For the 
17 MENA countries in our sample between 1990 and 2000 we have 187 observations (17*11) 
on the dependent variable IMF1 (BB1)
29, of which 72% (85%) fall into the flexible exchange 
rate category and 28% (15%) in the fixed category. Before turning to the regression analysis, 
we examine the correlation matrix for the potential determinants of exchange rate regimes 
(table 4 appendix). Even though many of these determinants are correlated (correlations 
between KAP15, KAP25 and PCGDP5 are relatively high) with each other, there do not seem 
to be obvious sign of multicollinearity
30. 
III.2.1 Empirical results from binomial probit analysis  
 
The results of the binomial probit regressions for both the declared (IMF) classification and 
the de facto (BB) classification are respectively presented in Table 1and 2. We begin by using 
only structural (OCA) variables and macroeconomic variables as regressors, then we 
introduce in turn political and capital account openness variables. One way to interpret this 
exercise is as a robustness check: are the results of the basic model robust with regard to the 
introduction of alternative explanatory variables? A positive sign of a coefficient means that 
                                                 
28 The democracy variable is an index which takes values from 0 to 10, and captures the competitiveness of 
political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the existence of 
constraints on the power of the executive. 
29 The dependent variable is noted IMF1 (BB1) when estimations are obtained from the IMF de jure 
classification (BB de facto classification). 
30We use 5 period lagged series (indicated by placing a 5 after the variable) where we believe endogeneity may 
be a concern. 
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an increase of the associated variable raises the probability of adopting a flexible exchange 
rate regime. The main results of Table 1 and Table 2 can be summarized as follows. 
 
 
Table 1: Probit regressions for IMF1 with structural, macroeconomic and political factors  
(Likelihood to float) 
Variables 
 
Regression (1)  Regression (2)  Regression (3) 
OCA Variables       
OPEN5 0.814922 
(0.31) 
2.767293  
(0.98) 
3.019145 
(1.13) 
GEOCON 1.40e-06 
(0.01) 
1.26e-06  
(0.01) 
-6.61e-08 
(0.01) 
PCGDP5 -0.000432 
(2.13)** 
-0.0005661  
(2.03) ** 
-0.0004281 
(1.7) * 
RGDP5 -1.87e-11 
(0.9) 
-1.63e-11  
(0.48) 
-2.61e-11 
(1.15) 
CAPMOB -15.34237 
(1.42) 
-18.7718  
(1.55) 
-2.405346 
(0.16) 
Macroeconomic Variables       
RESM5  -0.8450951 
(2.73)*** 
-0.8290433  
(2.09) ** 
-0.8862867 
(2.44) ** 
DINF -0.0294867 
(0.76) 
-.0305794  
(0.48)  
0.1206738 
(1.76)  
CAGDP5 0.111106 
(1.96)** 
0.1591172  
(1.56) 
0.1710459 
(2.15) ** 
Political Variables       
DEMOC   0.2779743 
(0.64) 
-0.1558103 
(0.41) 
DURAB   -0.0219154 
(0.36) 
0.0018959 
(0.05) 
Capital controls Variables       
KAP15     -0.7151971 
(0.33)  
KAP25     3.516986 
(2.14) ** 
Log-Likelihood  -24.93 -23.99  -23.40 
Chi-squared  57.15 45.39  41.72 
Number of observations  99 99  98 
*: test-statistic is significant at the 10% level; **:  significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level.  
Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. 
Constant terms are not reported. 
 
 
The variables OPEN5 (openness) and GEOCON (geographic concentration of trade) are never 
significant as determinants of exchange regimes. However the sign of the variable OPEN5 is 
positive in all regression suggesting that Openness has a positive influence on the probability 
of a country choosing a flexible exchange rate regime in the model. Collins (1996) argues that 
less open countries will have thinner markets for foreign exchange and that policy makers in 
these countries will find it more difficult to manage a flexible exchange rate system. Also, the 
results show that both RGDP5 (economic size) and CAPMOB (capital mobility) do not matter 
for the choice of exchange regime since they are not statistically significant. Finally, Analysis 
of the link between the exchange rate regime and economic development level brings out one 
clear conclusion: a relationship between the two does indeed exist. However, the findings in 
this case contradict the traditional OCA prediction, countries with high economic 
development levels tend to have fixed rather than flexible exchange rates. 
   10
Table 2: Probit regressions for BB1 with structural, macroeconomic and political factors 
 (Likelihood to float) 
Variables 
 
Regression (1)  Regression (2)  Regression (3) 
OCA Variables       
OPEN5 5.724225 
(1.29) 
4.816462 
(0.61) 
2.087983 
(0.47) 
GEOCON -7.971845 
(1.36) 
-4.36e-07 
 (0.00) 
-0.1218621 
(0.01) 
PCGDP5 -0.0004461 
(1.69) ** 
-0.0002962  
(0.71) 
-0.0003028 
(1.04) 
RGDP5 -1.02e-10 
(1.92) ** 
 2.86e-12 
(0.05) 
-1.29e-10 
(0.6) 
CAPMOB 65.32703 
(1.77) ** 
  139.4826 
(1.57) 
52.25949 
(-) 
Macroeconomic Variables       
RESM5  -0.9795338 
(2.11) ** 
-0.8368479 
(1.84) 
-0.8699923 
(2.6) *** 
DINF -0.143747 
(1.01) 
-0.3754321 
(1.6)  
-0.2513504 
(1.03) 
CAGDP5 -0.1931238 
(1.60) 
-0.2895444 
(1.72) * 
-0.3476362 
(2.36) ** 
Political Variables       
DEMOC   1.191812 
(1.85) * 
0.2993509 
(1.96) ** 
DURAB   -0.7411469 
(1.84) * 
-0.1452422 
(1.75) * 
Capital controls Variables       
KAP15     8.314174 
(1.66) * 
KAP25     0.3374789 
(0.25) 
Log-Likelihood  -24.11 -21.17  -21.36 
Chi-squared  20.40 21.04  13.48 
Number of observations  99 99  98 
*: test-statistic is significant at the 10% level; **:  significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level.  
Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. 
Constant terms are not reported. 
 
Turning to macroeconomic variables, we find that the international reserve indicator 
(RESM5) play a significant role in the selection of the exchange rate regime in the MENA 
countries. The coefficient of the variable RESM5 is negative and significant in all 
specifications. This result supports the hypothesis that economies with high reserves to 
imports ratios tend to adopt fixed exchange rate regimes as large reserves can enhance the 
sustainability of such regimes. In contrast the two other macroeconomic variables, divergence 
between rates of inflation (DINF) and the current account balance ratio to GDP (CAGDP5) 
turn out to be insignificant. 
 
Regarding political variables, the results appear less convincing. Estimations based on the 
IMF de jure classification (with the dependent variable IMF1) show that neither the variable 
DEMOC nor the variable DURAB are significant suggesting that government strength does 
not have any significant explanatory power. However, when using the BB classification, the 
two variables turn out to be significant and have coherent signs. The democracy (durability) 
variable has a positive (negative) and significant sign suggesting that authoritarian   11
governments tend to ovoid the temptation to inflate by “tying their hands” by adopting a fixed 
exchange rate regime.   
 
Finally, the dummy for the restrictions on capital account transactions, included in the IMF 
(BB) regression was negative (positive) but insignificant (significant), while the composite 
capital controls variable  was positive and significant (insignificant) in the IMF (BB) 
regression.  This result is also surprising, as fixed exchange rate regimes were expected to be 
more likely when restrictions on the capital account were present. The relatively high 
correlation between these two variables leads us to suspect that multicollinearity underlies the 
absence of significant and robust results. 
 
III.2.2 Empirical results from multinomial probit analysis 
 
So far we have assumed that the dependent variable can take only two values (0 and 1). From 
an economic point of view we have assumed that the crucial choice is between pegging and 
floating without considering a third, intermediate possibility. Now we release this hypothesis 
and assume that a single country faces three different alternatives and can choose between a 
fixed, an intermediary and a flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
Table 3 and 4 present the results of probit analysis, conducted as in the previous subsection 
using an unbalanced panel data set. The regressions are presented in their multinomial 
version- that is, the dependent variable takes the values 0 for a fixed exchange regime, 1 for 
an intermediary regime and 2 for a flexible exchange rate regime
31. In this case, for the 17 
MENA countries included in our sample we also have 187 observations on IMF2 (BB2), of 
which 50% (76%) fall into the fixed exchange rate category, 23% (9%) in the intermediate 
category and 27% (15%) in the flexible category. 
 
The results from multinomial probit regressions, shown in Table 3 and 4, are completely in 
line with our previous findings. As can be seen, even though the coefficients of most of the 
explanatory variables included in the estimations are insignificant, it is clear that a robust 
regularity exists for the variables PCGDP5 and RESM5. In the majority of regressions, the 
coefficient of the variable PCGDP5 is negative and significant suggesting that countries with 
relatively developed goods markets tend to opt for fixed exchange rate regimes, a result that is 
consistent with previous findings of Honkapohja and  Pikkarainen (1992) and Edwards 
(1998). Also, the significant negative coefficient of variables RESM5 supports the evidence 
that high levels of international reserves are more likely to be associated with fixed exchange 
rate regimes. Thus, we can assume that a systematic relationship does exist between the 
choice of exchange regimes by the MENA countries, the economic development level and the 
amount of reserves in these economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 The dependent variable is noted IMF2 (BB2) when estimations are obtained from the IMF de jure 
classification (BB de facto classification).   12
Table 3: Probit regressions for IMF2 with structural, macroeconomic and political factors  
(Likelihood to float) 
Variables 
 
Regression (1)  Regression (2)  Regression (3) 
OCA Variables       
OPEN5 1.715045 
(1.18) 
3.923531 
(1.99) * 
3.903757 
(1.73) * 
GEOCON 2.13e-06 
(0.00) 
1.62e-06 
(0.00) 
1.54e-06 
(0.00) 
PCGDP5 -0.0002007 
(1.79) * 
-0.0004632 
(2.49) ** 
-0.0005542 
(1.94) * 
RGDP5 1.01e-11 
(1.11) 
1.36e-11 
(1.09) 
1.30e-11 
(0.83) 
CAPMOB -4.661371 
(0.91) 
-7.051363 
(1.23) 
-7.347158 
(1.25) 
Macroeconomic Variables       
RESM5  -0.4245496 
(2.54) ** 
-0.5829736 
(3.38) *** 
-0.6008529 
(3.13) *** 
DINF -0.0124675 
(0.34) 
-0.0052717 
(0.17) 
-0.0195388 
(0.48) 
CAGDP5 0.0350978 
(1.08) 
0.055608 
(1.45) 
0.0612254 
(1.45) 
Political Variables       
DEMOC   0.9997152 
(1.28) 
1.327016 
(1.23) 
DURAB   0.0401459 
(1.71) * 
  0.039684 
(1.33) 
Capital controls Variables       
KAP1     0.1297164 
(0.06) 
KAP2     -0.3297622 
(0.50) 
Log-Likelihood  -36.14 -32.98  -32.80 
Chi-squared  51.54 44.35  38.57 
Number of observations  99 99   
*: test-statistic is significant at the 10% level; **:  significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level.  
Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. 
Constant terms are not reported. 
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Table 4: Probit regressions for BB2 with structural, macroeconomic and political factors  
(Likelihood to float) 
Variables 
 
Regression (1)  Regression (2)  Regression (3) 
OCA Variables       
OPEN5 -3.088261 
(1.05) 
-4.433306 
(1.84)  
-0.5165456 
(0.24) 
GEOCON 3.80e-06 
 (0.00) 
5.236312 
(0.43) 
3.64e-06 
(0.00) 
PCGDP5 -  0.0003885 
(1.21)  
-0.001475 
(1.71) * 
-0.0003895 
(1.60) 
RGDP5 -6.25e-11   
(1.01)  
-8.80e-11 
(1.96) ** 
-2.41e-11 
(0.98) 
CAPMOB 11.44181   
(0.27) 
26.85255 
(0.69) 
-2.276308 
(0.09) 
Macroeconomic Variables       
RESM5  -0.2879179 
(2.10) * 
-0.1586797 
(1.58) 
-0.204734 
(2.13) ** 
DINF -0.0850353 
(1.14)  
-0.1426102 
(1.65) * 
-0.0544805 
(1.29) 
CAGDP5 -0.1255599 
(0.85) 
-0.0897147 
(1.74) * 
-0.0192205 
(0.80) 
Political Variables       
DEMOC   0.1821783 
(1.13) 
0.0858857 
(0.66) 
DURAB   -0.0383553 
(1.10) 
0.0405668 
(0.87) 
Capital controls Variables       
KAP1     0.0211148 
(0.02) 
KAP2     0.0792916 
(0.15) 
Log-Likelihood  -26.29 -23.21  -25.59 
Chi-squared  20.80 26.52  19.86 
Number of observations  99 99  94 
*: test-statistic is significant at the 10% level; **:  significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level.  
Absolute t-statistics are displayed in parentheses under the coefficient estimates. 
Constant terms are not reported. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper investigated empirically the determinants of exchange rate regime choice in 17 
MENA countries during the 1990-2000 period. The explanatory variables considered included 
three sets of criteria highlighted in recent theoretical analyses: long-run determinants 
proposed by the OCA, political factors and the degree of capital account openness. In contrast 
to some of the existing empirical literature, our estimations show that among the variables 
suggested by the optimum currency area, only the level of economic development is an 
adequate and robust predictor of exchange regime choice in the MENA countries. It is shown 
that economies with high per capita incomes tend to opt for fixed exchange rate regimes.  Our 
analysis indicates at the same time that neither the political economy variables nor the capital 
account openness measures are robust or significant predictors of exchange rate regimes. 
Finally, the results suggest that international reserves levels have a significantly positive 
influence on the pegging decision. Based on these findings, we may conclude that the choices 
of exchange rate regime made by the MENA countries during the last decade have been 
consistently influenced by the international reserves. 
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Appendix I 
 
Table 1: Exchange Rate Arrangements in the MENA countries as of July 31, 2006 
 
Exchange rate regime 
Fixed exchange rate regimes  Intermediate regimes  Flexible regimes 
 
Exchange 
arrangeme
nts with no 
separate 
legal 
tender 
Currency 
Board 
arrangement
s 
Other 
conventional 
fixed peg 
arrangements 
Pegged 
exchange 
rates within 
horizontal 
bands 
Crawling 
Peg 
Managed 
Floating 
with no 
pre-
determine
d path for 
the 
exchange 
rate 
Independe
ntly 
floating 
Afghanistan          •   
Algeria           •   
Bahrain     • (1)        
Djibouti    •          
Egypt     • (1)        
Iran         •    
Iraq     • (1)        
Jordan     • (1)        
Kuwait     • (1)        
Lebanon     • (1)        
Libya     • (2)        
Mauritania     • (1)        
Morocco     • (2)        
Oman     • (1)        
Pakistan     • (1)        
Qatar     • (1)        
Saudi Arabia     • (1)        
Syria     • (1)        
Tunisia           •   
UAE     • (1)        
Yemen           •   
(1) Pegged against a single currency 
(2) Pegged against a composite 
Source: IMF (2006) “Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions” 
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Table 2: Classifications of exchange rate regimes in the regressions 
  Binomial probit regressions 
 IMF1  BB1 
 
Fixed 
exchange 
rate 
regimes 
1- Exchange arrangements with no separate 
legal tender 
2- Currency Board arrangements 
3- Other conventional fixed peg arrangements 
4- Pegged exchange rates within horizontal 
bands 
5- Crawling Peg 
6- Crawling Band 
 
 
1- Another currency as legal tender 
2- Currency union 
3- Currency  board  
4- Conventional fixed peg of single currency 
5- Conventional fixed peg to basket 
6- Pegged within a horizontal band 
7- Forward-looking crawling peg 
8- Forward-looking crawling band 
9- Backward-looking crawling peg 
10- Backward-looking crawling band 
Flexible 
exchange 
rate 
regimes 
7- Managed Floating with no pre-determined 
path for the exchange rate 
8- Independently floating 
11- Tightly managed floating 
12- Other managed floating 
13- Independently floating 
 
  Multiomial probit regressions 
 IMF2  BB2 
Fixed 
exchange 
rate 
regimes 
1- Exchange arrangements with no separate 
legal tender 
2- Currency Board arrangements 
3- Other conventional fixed peg arrangements 
 
1- Another currency as legal tender 
2- Currency union 
3- Currency  board  
4- Conventional fixed peg of single currency 
 
Intermedia
te 
exchange 
rate 
regimes 
4- Pegged exchange rates within horizontal 
bands 
5- Crawling Peg 
6- Crawling Band 
5- Conventional fixed peg to basket 
6- Pegged within a horizontal band 
7- Forward-looking crawling peg 
8- Forward-looking crawling band 
9- Backward-looking crawling peg 
10- Backward-looking crawling band 
Flexible 
exchange 
rate 
regimes 
7- Managed Floating with no pre-determined 
path for the exchange rate 
8- Independently floating 
11- Tightly managed floating 
12- Other managed floating 
13- Independently floating 
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Table 3: Variables, Definitions, Data sources  
Variable Definition  Source   
• OCA variables    
OPEN5  Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP  WDI 
GEOCON  Share of major total partner in total exports  DOTS 
PCGDP5  Per capita, PPP (current international $)  WDI 
RGDP5  Real GDP   IFS 
CAPMOB  Absolute value of inward and outward flows 
of financial assets and liabilities as percentage 
of nominal GDP  
IFS 
• Political variables    
DEMOC  Index of democracy (0-10)  Marshall and Jaggers (2005) 
DURAB  Years the incumbent administration has been 
in office 
Freedom House 
• Currency crises 
variables 
  
KAP1  A binary dummy that indicates the existence 
or not of restrictions on capital account 
transactions 
Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions, IMF 
 
KAP2   the sum of four dummy variables that take the 
value of one if the country has multiple 
exchange rates, current account restrictions,  
capital account restrictions, and export 
proceeds surrender requirements, respectively. 
Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions, IMF 
• Macroeconomic 
variables 
  
RESM5  International reserves as percentage of imports  IFS 
DINF  Difference between inflation in the country 
and inflation in the USA 
IFS 
CAGDP5  Current account balance as a percentage of 
GDP 
IFS 
Notes: IFS = International Financial statistics 
WDI = World Bank World Development Indicators 
DOTS = Direction of Trade Statistics 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation matrix, 17 countries, 1990-2000  
 
  open5 pcgdp5  rgdp5  geocon capmob democ durab  kap15  kap25  resm5  cagdp5  dinf 
open5  1.00               
pcgdp5  0.48  1.00              
rgdp5  -0.44  0.17  1.00             
geocon  0.19  0.18  -0.06  1.00           
capmob  -0.33  -0.29  0.14  0.04  1.00         
democ  -0.08  -0.01  -0.13  -0.13  0.09  1.00        
durab  0.02 0.39 0.39 0.39  0.04 -0.47  1.00           
kap15  -0.42  -0.70  -0.02  -0.02  0.32  0.04  -0.40  1.00      
kap25  -0.46 -0.81 -0.16 -0.16  0.30  0.14 -0.39 0.81  1.00       
resm5  -0.15  -0.01 0.10 0.10  0.06 -0.15  0.16 0.17 0.07 1.00     
cagdp5  -0.07 0.23 -0.01  -0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.07 0.06 -0.06 0.35 1.00   
dinf  -0.19 -0.05 0.08  0.08  0.06  0.16 -0.31 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.19 1.00 
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